Comment EI-13981
Received or sent (printed as 9/29/2008)
The draft environmental environmental impact study (DEIS) fails to evaluate many criteria of the CN purchase of the EJ&E. The underlying research of the DEIS and its effect on other rail and vehicluar traffic, environmental and economic impacts should be sufficient to reject CN's proposed purchase. We should not allow this transaction to process and a foreign corporation to create many hardships with out just compensation. There are contradictory capacity conclusions in the executive summary as it relates to interference with other railroads and commuter service. By the proposed 2015 expansion date, the increase in traffic on the EJ&E rails would supposedly have no impact on tracks that cross EJ&E lines. However the appendix advises that the proposed increases unlikely to be able to accept the total number of trains that CN proposed in its operating plan". There is a failure to assess the likelihood of taxpayer investment in mitigation options. At an average cost of $35 million each, we would be looking at a minimum cost of $525 million for just the 15 crossings identified in the DEIS. The board would consider recommneing that CN pay only 5% to 50% of these costs. Whether or not local, state or federal taxing bodies would fund the remaining $250 million to $500 million is unknown. CN should not be able to increase their operations until after mitigation improvements have either been funded or been constructed. The capacity examination is based on CN’s operating plan rather than a full right of way capacity review. The US DOT estimates for increased rail traffic through the Chicago area call for an 88% increase while growth for tonnage along the EJ&E is only forcasted to grow by 2%. CN could use its right of way to add track and capacity to its lnes. It seems that the railroads are interested in maximizing growth when looking for public funding to support their industry, but want the opportunity to minimize growth projections in environmental impact studies when it better serves their interests. A valid and unbiased STB DEIS would not provide the industry or applicant with an under statement of the impact of the purchase when the reality is very different. The benefit to current CN line communities is accepted at face value when there cannot be a guarantee of reductions elsewhere. While traffic is supposed to be shifted off existing lines, there is a benefit to existing areas only if traffic indeed decreases. However, given the projected increase in overall in traffic, addition traffic on both lines would compound the current conditions rather than relieve them in some areas. There would be no benefit to those areas who under the proposed plan are supposed to see traffic reduction. The benefit to the region is accepted without proof. No shippers have come forward to guarantee that the purported cost savings they derive from CN operating efficiencies would accrue to them or the end consumer. All opponents hear is that this transaction would benefit the region and the nation The DEIS uses unsubstantiated and unsourced data in its conclusions. DEIS uses analysis and mitigation thresholds for noise and hazardous materials that are unsubstantiated and have been sharply criticized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of Transportation in previous Environmental Impact Studies prepared by SEA. There is an assumption that impacted communities know what can and should be mitigated and have negotiating power. The DEIS provides a broad range of mitigation possibilities without clearly indicating which measures the STB would likely impose on CN for specific levels of impact. Communities cannot negotiate results with CN individually, therefore it is clearly not in the region’s public interest to move forward with this transaction. There has been a failure to look broadly at indirect and cumulative effects. CN's aquisition of many regional railroads from 1998 to 2004 did not include environmental impact studies. It is clear that air quality assessments for this continued pattern of growth has not been reviewed. Also the issue of Homeland Security will be impacted. Since the majority of the freight will be entering North America at Prince Rupert Canada from Asia, containers will not be subject to the riggorous inspection that would occur if they entered via a US port. The fact that the origin of this freight and customs inspection processes were overlooked in the DEIS is unbelievable. There are false assurances on the proposed STAR Line. Despite the fact that various parts of the DEIS conclude that the EJ&E would reach capacity and interfere with Metra’s trains and freight trains under CN’s operating plan, in other parts of the DEIS, SEA concludes that this transaction would not preclude implementation of the STAR line (that is meant to connect suburban communities via commuter rail) but just add some “complexities.” The future assurances that would not have to be honored after the deal is approved are meaningless unless the FEIS mandates that when the STAR line is funded, CN will allow it to run on the current EJ&E rail line and give the commuter trains priority over its freight trains into perpetuity. The current Metra commuter rail service will likely be disrupted. Chapter 2 notes there are 6 at-grade crossings with Metra lines. Chapter four says there are only 4 crossings while table 4.1-4 listed 6 Metra crossings. The report notes conflicting conclusions. CN and Metra would have to work together so that CN expansion will not impact current an projected commuter rail service as CN increases traffic. Other parts the DEIS conclude that “On these line segments, there is little capacity beyond the train numbers reflected in the Applicants’ Operating Plan, for the applicants or other railroads to coordinate trackage-rights operations or to ensure non-interference of Applicants’ trains with the freight and passenger trains of other railroads crossing the EJ&E rail line at railroad/railroad crossings". Northwestern Indiana’s expansion of commuter rail service is ignored. The DEIS determined that the planned expansion of existing Northern Indiana commuter rail service “was not reasonably foreseeable” (page 4.1-49 of chapter 4) so SEA chose not to assess the impacts this transaction could have on those plans that would have commuter rails crossing the EJ&E at-grade in Griffith, Maynard, and Dyer. The expanded commuter rail service is also supported by a series of NIRPC studies and the NIRPC Board has taken a policy position to support it. It has strong support at the federal, state and local levels and the Phase I Alternatives analysis is underway and the results should become available shortly. It is wrong and unreasonable to dismiss and undercut the ongoing federally-funded feasibility study before it is completed. The list of substantially affected crossings is fatally flawed. Analyzing the effect of major increases of freight on the EJ&E and the potential for vehicular delays at grade crossings requires that numerous variables be calculated. The basic variable is the projected Average Daily Traffic (ADT) count on those roads crossing the EJ&E at grade level. Communities along the EJ&E have done their own current ADT counts and have determined in many instances that the ADT numbers that are used as SEA’s basis for projections of 2015 ADTs don’t accurately reflect the current ADTs, so they vastly undercount the ADTs these crossings can expect to experience by 2015. This is truly a situation where junk input data yielded junk results with the inevitable consequence being that the SEA list of 15 substantially impacted grade crossings in need of mitigation omits numerous other crossings up and down the EJ&E that will require equivalent levels of mitigation. The noise assessment methodology is outdated. The DEIS uses a methodology for generating noise contours and accounting for building shielding that is outdated and was used prior to the advent of high-speed personal computers. This methodology is too generalized and could result in inaccurate inclusion or exclusion of impacted homes that could require mitigation for noise impacts. In its Environmental Justice analysis, the DEIS fails to include a map showing low-income and minority homes that would be impacted by noise. Without this basic information, how can those communities even begin to negotiate with CN The life and death impacts are downplayed. If a community has limited personnel resources, an emergency response crew that is out on a call may deplete that community of EMS responders from the “right” side of the tracks if a subsequent call comes in. Compounding this problem is the fact that unlike many of the more populated areas along current CN lines, communities along the EJ&E have fewer through roads making it more difficult for first responders to travel expeditiously on alternative routes. Ultimately, if the closest medical facility is on the “wrong” side of the tracks, it doesn’t matter if both patient and ambulance started out on the “right” side of the tracks as they can’t get to the nearest medical facility. The increased risk of hazardous material spills are minimized. SEA should have analyzed the extent to which the current rail lines that now carry much of this hazardous cargo moved through the region by CN is through terrain that is qualitatively different from the topography surrounding the EJ&E. Unlike communities along current CN lines that enjoy access to Lake Michigan drinking water, many of the collar communities along the EJ&E depend upon a shallow aquifer system to supply 100% of their drinking water. Many of the areas along the EJ&E line are environmentally sensitive areas that would make a hazmat spill difficult to clean up expeditiously as it is surrounded by wetlands, lakes, and marshes. The type of land that abuts the EJ&E in areas would make it exceedingly difficult for a hazmat cleanup crew to access and operate in when addressing an emergency. The disastrous reality of what communities along the EJ&E could experience if a train derailed and resulted in a hazmat spill cannot be overstated. With a huge increase in freight volume as well as an increase in hazardous cargo loads, this risk is very real. Increased transport of hazardous materials is compounded by CN’s deplorable. The residential housing impacts are ignored. Although the DEIS admits that “some homes within 250 feet of a rail line with 20 additional trains could experience a decrease in property value” it concluded that this would have “only minor, negligible effects” if the transaction were to be approved. There is no attempt by SEA to actually determine how many homes along the EJ&E are within 250 feet of the line and then calculate the potential property value loss in any way, so it is hard to understand how SEA came to the conclusion that it is a non-issue. This is particularly problematic given the state of today’s housing market and the fact that much of the residential growth along the EJ&E has been recent. An August 2008 Zillow real estate study in the greater Chicagoland market said that about a third of all homes sold in 2006 and 2007 in the Chicago area are now financially "under water," meaning their owners have negative equity in the property. How many homes along the EJ&E will become negative equity situations if their values drop by a significant percentage? That the DEIS fails to take a hard look at this possibility when the federal government is enacting expensive programs to prevent home foreclosures is unacceptable. The regional business impacts are ignored. The DEIS concludes that the only jobs impact – direct, indirect or induced – would be in the rail industry, and that the 280 rail job losses would minimally impact the greater Chicagoland economy. This overly narrow focus on business impacts completely ignores the business and job losses that will likely occur in communities along the EJ&E. If consumers cannot easily get to their local businesses, these businesses will close in the communities adjacent to the EJ&E with only those having the financial resources having an option to relocate to other areas. This will decimate the sales tax base of impacted communities and create commercial ghost towns along the EJ&E. This analysis omission must be addressed and rectified in the FEIS. The local tax base harms are ignored. The fiscal health of the communities located along the EJ&E is based on revenues derived from property and sales taxes. That revenue is used to support school districts and maintain first responder capabilities in the region. The failure of the DEIS to calculate the ripple effect harms from a reduction in local business activity and property values, and then assess how that will harm the tax bases of these localities will have long-term consequences for the people who live in these communities now and for generations to come. The DEIS is wholly inadequate in examining the socioeconomic consequences that are likely to occur along the EJ&E if this transaction is approved. Contradictory data is used for air quality analysis. The Operational Air Emissions Methodology indicates that the DEIS provides two sets of emissions estimates. One is based on the original, published fuel use estimates (referred to as the “original estimates” throughout the DEIS) and the other is based on supplemented fuel use information submitted by CN in its May 23, 2008 filing (referred to as “revised estimates”.) The DEIS also states that “SEA used the General Conformity emissions thresholds (100 tons/year for all affected pollutants)” (p. 4.9-1). The DEIS also acknowledges that NOx is the “criteria pollutant of greatest concern with respect to the Proposed Action” (p. 4.9-10). For NOx the increase net change in emissions based on original estimates is 374.1 tons/yr (Table 4.9-11), which could pose a barrier to metropolitan Chicago’s efforts to achieve federally required air quality standards. The revised estimates reduce this number to 95.8 tons/yr (Table 4.9-12). The May 23, 2008 CN letter contains an exhibit with data that indicates a much lower change in operational fuel usage than previous estimates, but these numbers are not substantiated to the degree that the original estimates were by Exhibit C in the CN’s February 15, 2008 filing. In the May 23, 2008 filing, brief qualitative assumptions are provided to explain the changes, but no data is provided to verify the validity of the revised fuel use information. It could be construed that this change was made by CN to alleviate a major air quality roadblock to approving the transaction. In addition, the apparent assumption in the revised fuel data is that there would be no change in fuel used for EJ&E and other trains using EJ&E rail line as a result of the proposed action (CN filing from May 23, 2008). From the way that the fuel consumption is categorized by CN, it is apparent that the DEIS uses decreased idling time (of both CN and other trains) on CN and other lines to reduce the amount of fuel used. However, the data provided by CN – and consequently used in the DEIS for fuel consumption and air quality analysis – fails to provide an accounting for changes in fuel consumption that would result from changes in idling time by EJ&E and other trains on EJ&E lines. Based on the delay information presented in the Rail Operations segment of the DEIS it would seem that delay on EJ&E lines would increase for both EJ&E and other trains thus increasing their fuel use and air emissions. There is increased fuel usage and climate change effects. The DEIS includes both “original” and “revised” estimates for fuel use and states that an additional 723,684 gallons of fuel (or 2,569,889 gallons under the original estimate) would be used under CN’s proposed action in the year 2015. Contrast this with the CN claims of the project improving fuel use efficiency in the Chicago area. The reality is somewhat different. All this extra fuel consumption leads to emissions of greenhouse gases, a subject that is given short shrift in the DEIS. The DEIS seems to question whether human sources of green house gases are really much of a concern. It states that there are many other factors affecting climate change and that CO2 is a minor contributor to the greenhouse effect in comparison to water vapor and clouds. SEA’s dismissive approach to climate change is out-of-date and out of step with the position of the U.S. Government and overwhelming, worldwide scientific consensus. President George W. Bush recently pronounced that “the United States takes this issue seriously” and would be supporting the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent by 2050. The DEIS fails to analyze the cumulative effects of greenhouse gas emissions, despite many recent court decisions directing agencies to prepare such analyses as part of EISs. Please do not allow this transaction to go forward as you pass many burdens from a large foreign corporate body to our federal and state governments. CN cannot provide a large enough amount of mitigation to the offset the economic hardship they will create."
Submitted by: Brian Dockery
The Board publishes this comment in its environmental-comment table for this proceeding. It is quoted here as printed; nothing is inferred from it, and it states the commenter's own position in their own words, not this record's.
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