

**BEFORE THE  
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD**

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EX PARTE No. 770

URGENT ISSUES IN FREIGHT RAIL SERVICE

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EX PARTE No. 770 (Sub. No. 1)

URGENT ISSUES IN FREIGHT RAIL SERVICE

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**SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF  
MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYEES DIVISION/IBT; BROTHERHOOD OF  
RAILROAD SIGNALMEN; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SHEET METAL,  
AIR, RAIL AND TRANSPORTATION WORKERS/MECHANICAL DIVISION;  
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOILERMAKERS; INTERNATIONAL  
ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS DISTRICT #19;  
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF FIREMEN AND OILERS 32BJ/SEIU;  
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS AND TRAINMEN/IBT  
AND TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen/IBT, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division/IBT; Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen; International Association Of Boilermakers; International Association Of Machinists And Aerospace Workers District #19; International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers Mechanical Division; National Conference of Firemen and Oilers, 32BJ/SEIU, and the Transport Workers Union of America (“Unions”) submit these second supplemental Comments regarding the service, employment, and safety problems of the Class I railroads that gave rise to the Board’s opening of this docket.

Since the Unions' last filing in this sub-docket in May of 2023 (relying on data from February and March of 2023), the Class I railroads generally, and BNSF, CSXT, NSR and UP (the Big 4) in particular, have asserted that they have made strides in improving service and have increased employment; and they have rejected criticisms of their safety record, claiming that the number of derailments has been reduced in comparison to the number of derailments in the early 2000s. *See e.g.* Association of American Railroads ("AAR") letter dated July 7, 2023, various other filings in this sub-docket, and other public statements by the railroads. In this filing the Unions will respond to those assertions.

With respect to employment and service, the Big 4 are like a high jumper who sets the bar a foot off the ground, steps over it and awards himself/herself a medal. The increases in employment have been minuscule in comparison to prior reductions in employment; and the improvements in service have taken service on some carriers from bad to substandard and others from abysmal to bad. With respect to safety, the railroads offered a comparison to a completely irrelevant past, when they were still implementing the mega-mergers, and a mere 10 years from their worst financial circumstances in many decades. They also focused on numbers of derailments without acknowledging the reduction in train starts; they have thereby presented a deceptive picture of the frequency of derailments which are more accurately demonstrated by looking at Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") data on accidents/incidents per million train miles (thereby controlling for fewer, longer trains)— which show increases over the last decade.

## **EMPLOYMENT**

The railroads credit themselves with having increased employment since this Agency held hearings regarding the service failures of the Class I's in April of 2022. But climbing a few rungs up a ladder in a hole does not mean one is out of the hole. The employment data that the Big 4 report to this Agency show that for reporting categories L300, L400 and L600 (maintenance of way and signal, maintenance of equipment, train and engine service), in comparison to August of 2022, employment in August 2023 was up 4% at BNSF, 6% at CSXT, 7% at NSR and 4% at UP. *See* chart at Addendum A. But employment remains well below 2016 levels. Since 2016, employment in categories L300, L400 and L600 is down 13% at BNSF, 22% at CSXT, 28% at NSR and 26% at UP. And current employment is even below 2019 levels- after the railroads had adopted the ruthless cost-cutting business model. Since 2019 employment is down 15% at BNSF, 2% at CSXT, 20% at NSR and 17% at UP.

The railroads sometimes claim, especially with respect to employment cuts after 2019, that the reductions simply reflect declines in business. But that is not true. The reductions in employment, even since 2019, significantly exceed the reduced carloadings. For example BNSF carloadings are down 3% since 2016 and 7% since 2019 (whereas employment is down 13% and 15%), NSR carloadings are down 6% since 2016 and 11% since 2019 (whereas employment is down 28% and 20%), and UP carloadings are down 3% since 2016 and 1% since 2019 (whereas employment is down 26% and 17%). *See* chart at Addendum B (data for CSXT is not provided because its post-2021 data includes carloadings on the former ST/Pan Am). **It bears repeating that Union Pacific has barely seen any reduction in carloadings (3% and 1%) but it has the second largest reductions in employment (26% and 17%).**

The Rail Unions have repeatedly advised the Board that the reductions in employment have left the remaining employees with greater workloads and more responsibilities. The railroads have dismissed this as a concern. But the data they report to the STB shows that the reductions in employment have left workforces disproportionate to the work that remains. For example, the total track miles for the Big 4 has been essentially static since 2016, so the reduction in the engineering workforce (maintenance of way and signal) has meant that the current work force has to inspect, maintain, and repair the same infrastructure with fewer co-workers, and with increased burdens on the smaller work force. For example, using STB track miles data (R-1 Sched. 700) and L300 reports, we see that on BNSF the number of trackmiles per employee increased from 5.37 in 2016 to 6.30 in 2019 to 6.73 in 2022 (percentage increases of 20% since 2016 and 6% since 2019); for CSXT those numbers go from 6.09 to 7.09 to 7.34 (up 17% and 3%), for NSR those numbers go from 6.36 to 6.89 to 8.19 (up 22% and 16%), and for UP those numbers go from 4.63 to 5.45 to 6.43 (up 18% and 15%). *See* chart at Addendum C. There are factors that explain different track miles per employee among carriers (terrain, type of cargo, contracting-out), but those factors should be consistent for each carrier. And for each of the Big 4, the number of employees per track mile-- the imputed amount of territory each employee is responsible for, has increased, significantly.<sup>1</sup>

Data for the shopcraft workers (responsible for maintenance of equipment), tell a similar story; the number of employees relative to the number of locomotives and cars has been significantly reduced. The Class I's have reduced both their numbers of active locomotives and

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<sup>1</sup> The chart at Addendum C also shows trackmiles per employee based on BMWED and BRS membership data submitted to the Board last May (based on February and March data), those numbers show similar or greater increases in track miles per employee.

rail cars since 2015 (locomotives by 12.3% and cars by 22.1%)- thus reducing their capacity to move freight. But their reductions in numbers of shopcraft workers have been dramatic (43%); and, significantly, the ratio of shopcraft employees to locomotives has gone from 1.032 employees per locomotive, to 0.676 employees per locomotive (a reduction of 34%). *See* Addendum D. This reduction in the ratio of employees to locomotives increases the pressure on the remaining workers in their performance of inspection, maintenance and repair work; leads to pressure on employees to work quickly and less thoroughly (that has been documented by employee statements and in recent journalistic reporting); and it also further diminishes the railroads motive power capacity as the effectiveness of their active fleets is reduced when locomotives are not thoroughly and adequately inspected and maintained.

The shortages of train and engine service employees are of course well known to the Board. And while there have been small increases in their numbers, the railroads are still woefully understaffed for engineers and conductors, leading to continuing service problems (and also causing the railroads to pressure current staff to work without days off).

All of this data demonstrates that the Big 4 have dramatically reduced their workforces, and even reduced them since 2019, that the reductions have far exceeded the reductions in carloadings, and the reductions in numbers of employees has significantly increased the responsibilities (and attendant extra work time) for the employees who remain. And these changes cannot be explained away by the shift to so-called Precision Scheduled Railroading (“PSR”). Changing the schedules of trains, eliminating classification in yards, and running longer but fewer trains does not reduce the need for inspection, maintenance and repairs on the same amount of infrastructure (indeed longer trains tend to cause increase wear and tear on the

tracks). And while adoption of PSR has meant the railroads utilize fewer locomotives, with respect to the locomotives that remain, the ratio of mechanics to locomotives has been reduced—for every one locomotive, there are fewer mechanics than there were before 2016—so the reduction in mechanics cannot be explained away by citing the PSR-based reduction in the number of locomotives.

In its July 7, 2023 filing in this sub-docket, the AAR stated that “[i]n May 2023, total Class I railroad employment was up 6,620 employees over May 2022, and is at its highest level since April 2023 ”. This contention is frivolous, for several reasons. First, when put into context of the size of the current work force, and then the size of the workforce in prior years, the increases are insignificant. When the overall workforce has been reduced by 36,000 since 2016 and 27,000 since 2019 (for all Class I’s-based on L300, L400 and L600 reports), an increase of 6,000 barely moves the meter. Second, reporting absolute numbers and not percentages tends to mislead as to the magnitude of the change; what the AAR described is a 5.4% increase against prior reductions of 25% and 20%. Third, saying that current rail employment is the highest it has been since April of 2020 is absurd. The employment numbers reported in April of 2020 preceded the massive furloughs due to the pandemic; and May 2023 employment is still below March 2020 employment.

The Class I’s have attempted to justify their paltry results with respect to increasing employment by complaining of the difficulties of hiring in the current economy, that it has just become hard to hire new railroaders. Putting aside the railroads’ contribution to the reduced desirability of rail employment (*e.g.* wages that had not kept pace with inflation for decades, erosion of the wage differential between rail work and other jobs, extreme demands for extra

work due to the reduced workforces, pressure on employees to not do their work properly), the Class I's have ignored Amtrak's success in hiring where it made serious affirmative efforts to increase its workforce. Addendum A shows that Amtrak increased its workforce by 15% between August 2022 and August 2023; whereas BNSF, CSXT, NSR, and UP increased their workforces by 4%, 6%, 7%, and 4% respectively. In contrast to the Big 4, Amtrak made a real effort to recruit and retain workerstra

Accordingly, while the Class I's suggest that they have actually tried to increase their workforces, the data reported to the Board show otherwise. It seems that the Class I's seek to give the appearance of action to increase their workforces while actually keeping them relatively constant at levels well below pre-pandemic levels, even though volume is only slightly below pre-pandemic levels.

## **EFFECTS OF THE WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS ON SERVICE**

The reductions in employment adversely affect service. This should be self-evident since the rail workers are the ones who provide and support the service. But there are concrete examples of the impact of reduced employment on service. Even the railroads have admitted in this docket that they did not have enough train and engine service employees in 2022 prior to the Board's April 2022 hearings. UP likewise acknowledged in the Union Pacific embargoes proceeding (Ex Parte 772) that its reduction in train and engine service employees had contributed to its perceived need to impose embargoes. The impact of a shortage of train and engine service employees was also demonstrated in that proceeding by BLET, which showed how reductions in the numbers of Engineers correlated with areas where UP had imposed

embargoes. Additionally, as shown in the Unions first supplemental filing in this proceeding, BNSF's closing of shops and reduction in its mechanical workforce and consequent deferral of Federal Railroad Administration inspections, followed by a "0% overtime" initiative" resulted in BNSF being overdue for FRA required inspections for nearly 1000 locomotives (about a quarter of its active fleet), which caused BNSF to seek "enforcement discretion" from the FRA, and to contract-out such work (when it had never done so before) in a crash project to catch up on those inspections. This was at the same time as BNSF told the Navajo Transitional Energy Corp. that the carrier could not meet NTEC's shipping needs in part due to lack of trainsets. In the UP Embargoes proceeding and in Foster Poultry Farms (FD 36609), BMWED and BRS showed that the UP's Winnemucca line that was used to serve Foster Poultry Farms, was subject to slow orders and operated as "dark territory" due to failures of the signal system as a result of furloughs of Signalmen and Maintenance of Way workers and years of deferrals of undercutting and track renewal work (that would be performed by maintenance of way production gangs). NSR's destruction of the town of East Palestine was a result of poor safety practices and subordination of safety to movement of trains, but it also impacted service for shippers whose cars moved on that line. As the Unions showed in this proceeding, NSR had reduced the number of Carmen represented by the Transport Workers Union of America, who perform car inspections on that portion of the railroad from 601 in 2016, to 376 in 2019 to 228 in 2023. The work of Carmen includes inspecting wheels and wheel axles for damage and dripping lubricant-precursors to the sort of fires that led to the East Palestine derailment. These are just several concrete examples of the real world impact on service of the Class I's reducing their workforces.

## **SAFETY**

In prior filings in this proceeding, the Unions have asserted that the reductions in the workforces of the Big 4 have negatively impacted rail safety. In its July 7 filing, the AAR purported to contradict the Unions by asserting that “the last decade has been the safest on record”--by comparing 2022 FRA reportable accidents/incidents per million train miles to statistics from 2000. And, in arguments to the Board and Congress, and in press releases, the railroads have cited a reduction in the absolute number derailments over the last decade (without acknowledging that they are now operating fewer but longer trains), as rebutting the Unions’ contentions. But they have built their arguments on a fundamentally flawed comparison and cherry-picked data.

The Unions never contended that current safety data shows a decline in safety in comparison to 2000; they showed that the number of accidents/incidents per million train miles has increased over the last ten years. *See* Unions first supplemental comments. And using 2000 data as a comparison point is misguided. 2000 was just several years after consummation of the BNSF and UP-SP mergers; and CSXT and NSR were then still implementing their division of Conrail and merger of Conrail’s assets into their existing systems. Those mergers required operational changes, combinations of previously separate lines and yards, and integrations of previously separate workforces, with attendant needs for workers to become familiar with new operating and procedures rules. The chaos that followed each of the big merger and control transactions was well documented to this agency and was known to the public at large. It is no surprise that the early 2000s were not banner years for reportable accidents and incidents. Furthermore, 2000 was a mere nine years removed from 1991 when the railroads actually

suffered a decline in earnings and presented themselves to Presidential Emergency Board 219 as in such dire economic circumstances that PEB 219 recommended sweeping collective bargaining agreement changes, and Congress ultimately legislatively imposed those changes. By comparing current safety statistics to those in 2000, the Class I's have again set a low bar for themselves and then laud themselves for exceeding that low bar.

A better point of comparison is the ten year period from 2013 through 2022. FRA data is provided in ten year increments. More importantly, following full consummation of the mega-mergers and full integration of the railroads and workforces, the frequency of reportable accidents and incidents declined by 2013. But with implementation of the new ruthless cost-cutting business model, the frequency of reportable accidents and incidents increased; significantly in some respects. A chart included in the Unions' May submission provided the following information:

(FRA Rate of Accidents/Incidents per million train miles - controls for variation in length of trains)

| <b>CARRIER</b> | <b>ROAD DERAILMENTS</b> |             | <b>YARD DERAILMENTS</b> |             |
|----------------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|
|                | <b>2013</b>             | <b>2022</b> | <b>2013</b>             | <b>2022</b> |
| <b>BNSF</b>    | 7.3                     | <i>7.9</i>  | 16.6                    | <i>18.7</i> |
| <b>CSXT</b>    | 9.8                     | <i>14</i>   | 16.6                    | <i>17.2</i> |
| <b>NSR</b>     | 11.4                    | <i>12.8</i> | 8.5                     | <i>21.3</i> |
| <b>UP</b>      | 10.5                    | <i>13.9</i> | 12.7                    | <i>23.1</i> |

AAR's July 7 Comments purported to rebut the Unions' comments by citing irrelevant and selectively picked data. The railroads attempted to minimize the significance of yard derailments. But such derailments still can cause injuries; and derailments in yards can certainly impact service by disrupting yard operations. To suggest that the dramatic increases in yard derailments is meaningless is irresponsible. Furthermore, the FRA data show road derailments

have increased too. AAR then sought to diminish the significance of the increases in road derailments by noting that the road derailment data includes incidents at grade crossings. Putting aside the question of the validity of the argument for excluding grade crossing incidents (which the Unions do not accept), when the data for accidents/incidents not at grade crossings is examined, it too shows that their frequency has increased since 2013. The charts and graphs at Unions Addendum E provide FRA data for each year since 2013 and show that each of the Big 4 Class I's has experienced an increase in accidents and incidents per million train miles generally. Those charts and graphs also demonstrate the dramatic increases in frequency of yard accidents and incidents. And even when one looks at road accidents and incidents not at grade crossings (the railroads' preferred measurement), one sees that for 2022 compared with 2013, the rates are either the same or up: BNSF— 2.198 in 2013 and 2.195 in 2022; CSXT- 0.59 in 2013 and 0.705 in 2022; UP— 1.094 in 2013 and 1.013 in 2022 (but after 3 years at 1.624, 1.283 and 1.411); and NSR— 0.617 in 2013 and 0.918 in 2022. Accordingly, the FRA data (that account for the fewer longer trains) do show an overall increase in accidents/incidents per million train miles, a dramatic increase in the rate of yard accidents and incidents, an increase in the rate of road accidents and incidents, and an overall increase the rate of road accidents and incidents excluding grade crossings, with BNSF essentially holding steady and the others in the Big 4 showing increases in that category too. It is certainly not the case that recent data show an improvement in rail safety as contended by the AAR; and the railroads continued citation to a decrease in derailments in absolute terms is just disingenuous.

## CONCLUSION

In the year and a half since the Board held hearings in this docket, the Class I's have provided a lot of data that is often in unenlightening; and they have repeatedly offered assurances that they have been taking steps to improve service and to increase employment in order to provide better service. They have also claimed that their service, safety, and recruitment and retention problems are unrelated to their adoption of the ruthless cost-cutting business model. But the Class I's are either just achieving or failing to match the extremely modest service targets they set for themselves. And the Unions have repeatedly shown, with extensive documentary evidence, and have done so again in these comments, that employment remains substantially below 2016 levels— which coincides with adoption of the new business model; the Unions have also shown that despite the self-congratulatory statements of the Big 4 regarding their supposed progress on increasing their workforces since the April 2022 hearings, they have actually made only minimal progress; and the current workforces remain well below even 2019 workforce levels. The Unions have also demonstrated with particularity how the reductions in employment have negatively impacted service and safety. Additionally, the Unions have shown that the railroads' proffered explanations for the stagnancy of their workforces are specious; in particular that it is not true that they suffer from some insurmountable inability to recruit and retain workers today; nor is it true that the reductions in their workforces merely reflect lower volumes (which have fallen far less than their employment numbers).

It seems that the railroads are staffing with a view to a recession that appears less and less likely to occur; and that they are again staffing assuming “blue skies” scenarios, rather than anticipating likely changes in demand and weather-- and they will once again find themselves

short on employees sufficient to meet reasonable service demands, they will then once again claim that the mismatches were unforeseeable, when they are in fact readily foreseeable. And, contrary to the assertions of the railroads regarding safety, besides what industry stakeholders have seen with their own eyes, FRA data reveals that the frequency of reportable accidents and incidents has increased along with adoption of the new business model; this in turn correlates with the reductions in rail employment.

The Unions respectfully urge the Board to continue to press the railroads on the adequacy of the service they provide, and the adequacy of their workforces to provide levels of service that satisfy their common carrier obligations. The Unions again urge the Board to do all it can to enforce service standards and the common carrier obligation, and to advise Congress if the Board feels that it currently lacks sufficient authority to remedy service problems and enforce the common carrier.

Respectfully submitted,

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RAIL UNIONS SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS  
ADDENDUM A

**STB EMPLOYMENT DATA FOR BIG 4 CLASS I'S AND AMTRAK**  
**8/23 VS. 8/22, 8/23 VS. 8/19, AND 8/23 VS. 8/16**

**BNSF:**

|          | 8/23   | 8/22   | % Change<br>8/22 vs. 8/23 | 8/19   | % Change<br>8/19 vs. 8/23 | 8/16   | % Change<br>8/16 vs. 8/23 |
|----------|--------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
| Eng L300 | 8,187  | 8,137  | + 0.6%                    | 8,572  | - 4%                      | 9,890  | - 17%                     |
| M/E L400 | 6,581  | 6,383  | + 3%                      | 8,665  | - 24%                     | 7,937  | - 17%                     |
| T+E L600 | 15,674 | 14,601 | + 7%                      | 18,079 | - 13%                     | 17,042 | - 8%                      |
| Total    | 30,442 | 29,121 | + 4%                      | 35,946 | - 15%                     | 34,869 | - 13%                     |

**CSXT:**

|          | 8/23   | 8/22   | % Change<br>8/22 vs. 8/23 | 8/19   | % Change<br>8/19 vs. 8/23 | 8/16   | % Change<br>8/16 vs. 8/23 |
|----------|--------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
| Eng L300 | 5,126  | 4,866  | + 5%                      | 5,081  | + 1%                      | 6,054  | - 15%                     |
| M/E L400 | 2,615  | 2,398  | + 8%                      | 3,046  | - 14%                     | 4,165  | - 37%                     |
| T+E L600 | 7,691  | 7,188  | + 6%                      | 7,543  | + 2%                      | 9,564  | - 20%                     |
| Total    | 15,432 | 14,452 | + 6%                      | 15,670 | - 2%                      | 19,783 | - 22%                     |

**NS:**

|          | 8/23   | 8/22   | % Change<br>8/22 vs. 8/23 | 8/19   | % Change<br>8/19 vs. 8/23 | 8/16   | % Change<br>8/16 vs. 8/23 |
|----------|--------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
| Eng L300 | 4,444  | 4,282  | + 4%                      | 5,161  | - 14%                     | 5,602  | - 21%                     |
| M/E L400 | 2,672  | 2,408  | + 10%                     | 4,757  | - 44%                     | 5,540  | - 52%                     |
| T+E L600 | 8,873  | 8,196  | + 8%                      | 10,056 | - 12%                     | 11,196 | - 21%                     |
| Total    | 15,989 | 14,866 | + 7%                      | 19,974 | - 20%                     | 22,338 | - 28%                     |

**UP:**

|          | 8/23   | 8/22   | % Change<br>8/22 vs. 8/23 | 8/19   | % Change<br>8/19 vs. 8/23 | 8/16   | % Change<br>8/16 vs. 8/23 |
|----------|--------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
| Eng L300 | 8,105  | 8,071  | + .04%                    | 9,481  | - 14%                     | 1,111  | - 27%                     |
| M/E L400 | 4,934  | 4,840  | + 2%                      | 6,445  | - 23%                     | 8,993  | - 45%                     |
| T+E L600 | 14,704 | 13,802 | + 4%                      | 17,494 | - 16%                     | 17,397 | - 15%                     |
| Total    | 27,743 | 26,713 | + 4%                      | 33,420 | - 17%                     | 37,501 | - 26%                     |

**Amtrak:**

|          | 8/23   | 8/22   | % Change<br>8/22 vs. 8/23 | 8/19   | % Change<br>8/19 vs. 8/23 | 8/16   | % Change<br>8/16 vs. 8/23 |
|----------|--------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
| Eng L300 | 4,387  | 3,470  | + 21%                     | 3,147  | + 28%                     | 3,273  | +25%                      |
| M/E L400 | 4,883  | 4,125  | + 15%                     | 4,366  | + 11%                     | 4,735  | +3%                       |
| T+E L600 | 3,402  | 3,177  | + 6%                      | 3,308  | + 3%                      | 3,449  | -1%                       |
| Total    | 12,672 | 10,772 | + 15%                     | 10,821 | + 15%                     | 11,457 | + 10%                     |

**RAIL UNIONS SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS  
ADDENDUM B**

**FREIGHT CARRIED BY BNSF, NS, AND UP**  
**2022 VS. 2019 AND 2022 VS. 2016<sup>1</sup>**

**BNSF:**

|          | 2019  | 2022 | % Change<br>2019 vs. 2022 | 2016   | % Change<br>2016 vs. 2022 |
|----------|-------|------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
| Carloads | 10.2M | 9.5M | - 7%                      | 9.8M   | - 3%                      |
| Tons     | 580M  | 519M | - 11%                     | 556.7M | - 7%                      |

**NS:**

|          | 2019   | 2022   | % Change<br>2019 vs. 2022 | 2016   | % Change<br>2016 vs. 2022 |
|----------|--------|--------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
| Carloads | 7.6M   | 6.8M   | - 11%                     | 7.2M   | - 6%                      |
| Tons     | 358.7M | 311.9M | - 13%                     | 346.9M | - 11%                     |

**UP:**

|          | 2019 | 2022 | % Change<br>2019 vs. 2022 | 2016   | % Change<br>2016 vs. 2022 |
|----------|------|------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
| Carloads | 8.3M | 8.2M | - 1%                      | 8.4M   | - 3%                      |
| Tons     | 467M | 464M | - 1%                      | 476.7M | - 1%                      |

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<sup>1</sup> CSXT is not included due to the addition of Pan Am in 2021.

RAIL UNIONS SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS  
ADDENDUM C

**BIG 4 CLASS I TRACKAGE (FROM R-1 SCHED 700-TOTAL)**  
**AND ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES**

| <b>Carrier</b> | <b>Total Track</b> | <b>STB Ement<br/>Reports L300</b> | <b>Miles of<br/>Track/Eee</b> | <b>BMWED<br/>members</b> | <b>Miles of<br/>Track/Eee</b> | <b>BRS<br/>member</b> | <b>Miles of<br/>Track/Eee</b> |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| <b>BNSF</b>    |                    |                                   |                               |                          |                               |                       |                               |
| 2016           | 53,115             | 9,890                             | 5.37                          | 7,417                    | 7.16                          | 2,262                 | 23.5                          |
| 2019           | 54,017             | 8,572                             | 6.30                          | 6,471                    | 8.34                          | 2,150                 | 25.1                          |
| 2022           | 54,806             | 8,173                             | 6.73                          | 5,798                    | 9.45                          | 1,907                 | 28.7                          |
| <b>CSXT</b>    |                    |                                   |                               |                          |                               |                       |                               |
| 2016           | 36,863             | 6,054                             | 6.09                          | 4,505                    | 8.18                          | 1,938                 | 19.0                          |
| 2019           | 36,030             | 5,081                             | 7.09                          | 3,917                    | 9.19                          | 1,580                 | 22.8                          |
| 2022           | 35,701             | 4,866                             | 7.34                          | 3,881                    | 9.19                          | 1,400                 | 25.5                          |
| <b>NSR</b>     |                    |                                   |                               |                          |                               |                       |                               |
| 2016           | 35,615             | 5,602                             | 6.36                          | 3,677                    | 9.68                          | 1,498                 | 23.7                          |
| 2019           | 35,592             | 5,161                             | 6.89                          | 3,401                    | 10.4                          | 1,326                 | 26.8                          |
| 2022           | 35,064             | 4,282                             | 8.19                          | 2,882                    | 12.1                          | 1,026                 | 34.2                          |
| <b>UP</b>      |                    |                                   |                               |                          |                               |                       |                               |
| 2016           | 51,500             | 11,111                            | 4.63                          | 7,980                    | 6.45                          | 2,557                 | 20.1                          |
| 2019           | 51,743             | 9,481                             | 5.45                          | 6,966                    | 7.42                          | 2,127                 | 24.3                          |
| 2022           | 51,954             | 8,071                             | 6.43                          | 6,034                    | 8.61                          | 1,918                 | 27.1                          |

RAIL UNIONS SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS  
ADDENDUM D

| CARRIER | 2015 LOCOMOTIVES | 2015 CARS | 2019 LOCOMOTIVES | 2019 CARS | 2022 LOCOMOTIVES |
|---------|------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|------------------|
| BNSF    | 8,000            | 77,000    | 8,000            | 70,000    | 7,500            |
| UP      | 8,464            | 66,863    | 7,691            | 56,876    | 7,338            |
| CSX     | 4,463            | 66,386    | 3,561            | 51,498    | 3,608            |
| NS      | 4,353            | 76,641    | 3,906            | 50,553    | 3,190            |
| CN      | 2,180            | 63,913    | 2,398            | 64,607    | 2,351            |
| CP      | 1,549            | 39,420    | 1,379            | 35,268    | 1,366            |
| KCS     | 1,044            | 21,331    | 949              | 17,747    | 1,006            |
| Total   | 30,053           | 411,554   | 27,884           | 346,549   | 26,359           |

Note 1: All years use December 31st date for respective 10-K reporting year (e.g., December 31, 2015) and % change is 2015 vs 2022.

Note 2: Data includes all reported locomotives and cars in US & CA for CN & CP.

| <b>2022 CARS</b> | <b>% Change - Locomotives</b> | <b>% Change - Cars</b> |
|------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| 68,000           | <b>-6.3%</b>                  | <b>-11.7%</b>          |
| 56,379           | <b>-13.3%</b>                 | <b>-15.7%</b>          |
| 47,024           | <b>-19.2%</b>                 | <b>-29.2%</b>          |
| 40,470           | <b>-26.7%</b>                 | <b>-47.2%</b>          |
| 56,469           | <b>7.8%</b>                   | <b>-11.6%</b>          |
| 34,973           | <b>-11.8%</b>                 | <b>-11.3%</b>          |
| 17,339           | <b>-3.6%</b>                  | <b>-18.7%</b>          |
| 320,654          | <b>-12.3%</b>                 | <b>-22.1%</b>          |

| 2015 Shop Craft EE Count   | 2015 LOCOMOTIVES         | 2015 CARS                   | 2022 Shop Craft EE Count | 2022 LOCOMOTIVES           | 2022 CARS                 |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 31,004                     | 30,053                   | 411,554                     | 17,820                   | 26,359                     | 320,654                   |
| <i>Shop Craft EE Ratio</i> | 1.032                    | 0.075                       |                          | 0.676                      | 0.0556                    |
|                            |                          |                             |                          |                            |                           |
|                            | <b>% Change EE Count</b> | <b>% Change Locomotives</b> | <b>% Change Cars</b>     | <b>% EE Ratio to Loco.</b> | <b>% EE Ratio to Cars</b> |
|                            | -43%                     | -12%                        | -22%                     | -34%                       | -26%                      |

RAIL UNIONS SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS  
ADDENDUM E

|                                            | BNSF Total Accidents/Incidents |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                                            | 2013                           | 2014        | 2015        | 2016        | 2017        | 2018        | 2019        | 2020        | 2021        | 2022        |
| Total Train Miles                          | 185,133,804                    | 189,985,708 | 185,617,947 | 171,115,857 | 179,673,585 | 187,205,285 | 175,762,344 | 155,163,908 | 155,850,593 | 152,164,328 |
| Total Accidents/Incidents                  | 1,354                          | 1,409       | 1,335       | 1,260       | 1,276       | 1,285       | 1,245       | 1,137       | 1,096       | 1,228       |
| Rate of Total Acc/Incs per mil train miles | 7.314                          | 7.416       | 7.192       | 7.363       | 7.102       | 6.864       | 7.083       | 7.328       | 7.032       | 8.07        |

|                                             | BNSF Accidents Not at Grade-Crossings |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                                             | 2013                                  | 2014        | 2015        | 2016        | 2017        | 2018        | 2019        | 2020        | 2021        | 2022        |
| Total Train Miles                           | 185,133,804                           | 189,985,708 | 185,617,947 | 171,115,857 | 179,673,585 | 187,205,285 | 175,762,344 | 155,163,908 | 155,850,593 | 152,164,328 |
| Train Accidents (Not at Grade-Crossings)    | 407                                   | 409         | 424         | 355         | 361         | 399         | 386         | 326         | 277         | 334         |
| Derailments                                 | 281                                   | 301         | 316         | 265         | 276         | 308         | 310         | 268         | 230         | 282         |
| Rate of Train Accidents per mil train miles | 2.198                                 | 2.153       | 2.284       | 2.075       | 2.009       | 2.131       | 2.196       | 2.101       | 1.777       | 2.195       |

|                                               | BNSF Accidents on Yard Track |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
|                                               | 2013                         | 2014     | 2015     | 2016     | 2017     | 2018     | 2019     | 2020     | 2021     | 2022     |
| Yard switching miles                          | 14384791                     | 14694108 | 14585458 | 13462228 | 13624947 | 14076184 | 13675512 | 11897911 | 11669604 | 11582627 |
| Accidents on yard track                       | 239                          | 237      | 254      | 216      | 232      | 262      | 256      | 204      | 171      | 219      |
| Rate of yard accidents / yard switching miles | 16.615                       | 16.129   | 17.415   | 16.045   | 17.028   | 18.613   | 18.72    | 17.146   | 14.653   | 18.908   |

|                                            | CSX Total Accidents/Incidents |             |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
|                                            | 2013                          | 2014        | 2015       | 2016       | 2017       | 2018       | 2019       | 2020       | 2021       | 2022       |
| Total Train Miles                          | 98,557,973                    | 101,030,612 | 94,523,913 | 82,469,989 | 78,743,628 | 73,538,893 | 72,009,132 | 61,312,795 | 62,081,481 | 60,657,967 |
| Total Accidents/Incidents                  | 963                           | 1,119       | 1,065      | 1,019      | 1,035      | 1,019      | 849        | 820        | 872        | 867        |
| Rate of Total Acc/Incs per mil train miles | 9.771                         | 11.076      | 11.267     | 12.356     | 13.144     | 13.857     | 11.79      | 13.374     | 14.046     | 14.293     |

|  | CSX Accidents Not at Grade-Crossings |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|--|--------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|  | 2013                                 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |

|                                             |            |             |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|---------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Total Train Miles                           | 98,557,973 | 101,030,612 | 94,523,913 | 82,469,989 | 78,743,628 | 73,538,893 | 72,009,132 | 61,312,795 | 62,081,481 | 60,657,967 |
| Train Accidents (Not at Grade-Crossings)    | 196        | 249         | 248        | 235        | 246        | 272        | 171        | 201        | 198        | 210        |
| Derailments                                 | 137        | 158         | 148        | 156        | 166        | 190        | 106        | 115        | 129        | 130        |
| Rate of Train Accidents per mil train miles | 0.59       | 0.508       | 0.548      | 0.659      | 0.994      | 0.982      | 0.675      | 0.793      | 0.854      | 0.705      |

|  | CSX Accidents on Yard Track |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|--|-----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|  | 2013                        | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |

|                                               |          |          |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |         |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Yard switching miles                          | 13865576 | 14464264 | 14185095 | 12669555 | 12346995 | 10376257 | 9771285 | 8349243 | 8195214 | 8154190 |
| Accidents on yard track                       | 123      | 173      | 183      | 152      | 152      | 184      | 108     | 146     | 131     | 149     |
| Rate of yard accidents / yard switching miles | 8.871    | 11.961   | 12.901   | 11.997   | 12.311   | 17.733   | 11.053  | 17.487  | 15.985  | 18.273  |

|  | Union Pacific Total Accidents/Incidents |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|--|-----------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|  | 2013                                    | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |

|                                            |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Total Train Miles                          | 165,730,013 | 173,476,413 | 161,620,754 | 147,346,532 | 151,371,710 | 153,273,017 | 134,969,063 | 112,744,190 | 111,312,172 | 113,518,843 |
| Total Accidents/Incidents                  | 1,733       | 1,801       | 1,698       | 1,570       | 1,640       | 1,787       | 1,817       | 1,495       | 1,578       | 1,678       |
| Rate of Total Acc/Incs per mil train miles | 10.457      | 10.382      | 10.506      | 10.655      | 10.834      | 11.659      | 13.462      | 13.26       | 14.176      | 14.782      |

|  | Union Pacific Accidents Not at Grade-Crossings |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|--|------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|  | 2013                                           | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |

|                                             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
|---------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Total Train Miles                           | 165,730,013 | 173,476,413 | 161,620,754 | 147,346,532 | 151,371,710 | 153,273,017 | 134,969,063 | 112,744,190 | 111,312,172 | 113,518,843 |
| Train Accidents (Not at Grade-Crossings)    | 521         | 478         | 509         | 587         | 633         | 459         | 481         | 505         | 198         | 210         |
| Derailments                                 | 385         | 360         | 383         | 322         | 341         | 382         | 422         | 306         | 319         | 330         |
| Rate of Train Accidents per mil train miles | 1.094       | 1.035       | 1.051       | 1.292       | 1.074       | 1.175       | 1.624       | 1.283       | 1.411       | 1.013       |


|                                               | Union Pacific Accidents on Yard Track |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
|                                               | 2013                                  | 2014     | 2015     | 2016     | 2017     | 2018     | 2019     | 2020     | 2021     | 2022     |
| Yard switching miles                          | 21255114                              | 21850812 | 21752304 | 18110262 | 18276258 | 18786516 | 17384302 | 14538416 | 14922426 | 14800560 |
| Accidents on yard track                       | 269                                   | 289      | 305      | 243      | 298      | 356      | 372      | 274      | 302      | 348      |
| Rate of yard accidents / yard switching miles | 12.656                                | 13.226   | 14.022   | 13.418   | 16.305   | 18.95    | 21.399   | 18.847   | 20.238   | 23.513   |

|                                            | Norfolk Southern Total Accidents/Incidents |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
|                                            | 2013                                       | 2014       | 2015       | 2016       | 2017       | 2018       | 2019       | 2020       | 2021       | 2022       |
| Total Train Miles                          | 95,826,624                                 | 95,834,520 | 96,408,418 | 91,492,114 | 94,408,560 | 92,345,042 | 87,580,692 | 72,682,231 | 69,241,355 | 68,826,390 |
| Total Accidents/Incidents                  | 1,092                                      | 1,159      | 1,054      | 1,094      | 1,127      | 1,149      | 1,223      | 991        | 1,001      | 926        |
| Rate of Total Acc/Incs per mil train miles | 11.396                                     | 12.094     | 10.933     | 11.957     | 11.937     | 12.442     | 13.964     | 13.635     | 14.457     | 13.454     |


|                                             | Norfolk Southern Accidents Not at Grade-Crossings |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
|                                             | 2013                                              | 2014       | 2015       | 2016       | 2017       | 2018       | 2019       | 2020       | 2021       | 2022       |
| Total Train Miles                           | 95,826,624                                        | 95,834,520 | 96,408,418 | 91,492,114 | 94,408,560 | 92,345,042 | 87,580,692 | 72,682,231 | 69,241,355 | 68,826,390 |
| Train Accidents (Not at Grade-Crossings)    | 193                                               | 228        | 213        | 237        | 220        | 255        | 289        | 262        | 263        | 290        |
| Derailments                                 | 143                                               | 188        | 171        | 192        | 175        | 178        | 181        | 140        | 156        | 134        |
| Rate of Train Accidents per mil train miles | 0.617                                             | 0.678      | 0.505      | 0.541      | 0.62       | 0.84       | 0.894      | 0.993      | 0.847      | 0.918      |

|                                               | Norfolk Southern Accidents on Yard Track |          |          |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
|                                               | 2013                                     | 2014     | 2015     | 2016     | 2017     | 2018     | 2019     | 2020    | 2021    | 2022    |
| Yard switching miles                          | 13122102                                 | 13293264 | 13284199 | 12063641 | 12172602 | 12601044 | 11483742 | 9223176 | 7840338 | 7797055 |
| Accidents on yard track                       | 111                                      | 135      | 151      | 155      | 142      | 163      | 181      | 184     | 185     | 209     |
| Rate of yard accidents / yard switching miles | 8.459                                    | 10.156   | 11.367   | 12.849   | 11.666   | 12.935   | 15.761   | 19.95   | 23.596  | 26.805  |


### BNSF Total Accident/Incidents




### BNSF Accidents Not at Grade-Crossings




### BNSF Accidents on Yard Track



### Union Pacific Total Accidents/Incidents






### Union Pacific Accidents Not at Grade-Crossings




### Union Pacific Accidents on Yard Track






### Norfolk Southern Total Accidents/Incidents



### Norfolk Southern Accidents Not at Grade-Crossings



### Norfolk Southern Accidents on Yard Track

