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Before the
Surface Transportation Board

JR - 30

STB DOCKET NO. AB-167 (Sub-No. 1189X)

**CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION – ABANDONMENT EXEMPTION –
IN HUDSON COUNTY, NJ**

STB DOCKET NO. AB-55 (Sub-No. 686X)

**CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. – DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE EXEMPTION –
IN HUDSON COUNTY, NJ**

STB DOCKET NO. AB-290 (Sub-No. 306X)

**NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY – DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE
EXEMPTION – IN HUDSON COUNTY, NJ**

**RIFFIN’S OBSERVATIONS REGARDING HIS
MOTION TO DISMISS**

1. Comes now James Riffin, (“**Riffin**”) who herewith respectfully provides the Surface Transportation Board (“**STB**”) with his observations regarding his December 21, 2016 filed Motion to Dismiss the above entitled proceeding.
2. Replies to Riffin’s Motion to Dismiss were due on or before January 10, 2017.
3. Conrail noted that it was not filing a reply, unless and until the STB gave notice that it was accepting into the record Riffin’s Motion to Dismiss. The LLCs have remained silent. City et al.

is the only party that filed a ‘reply.’¹

4. Riffin calls this pleading his ‘observations,’ rather than a ‘reply’ for two reasons: (A) Replies to a reply are not permitted, without leave of the STB. (B) Two parties did not file a reply.

5. Not that any of that much matters. Jurisdiction is something that an agency (and a court) **must** address, for an agency (and a court) may only address a matter before it, **IF** it has the requisite jurisdiction to address the matter.

6. The issue of jurisdiction may be raised **at any time** (including, for the first time, on appeal). And once raised, the agency / court **is required** to address the issue. (Even if the party raising the issue, is presently not a party / has never been a party.)

7. Jurisdiction **cannot be conferred by consent of the parties**. An agency / court either has, or does not have, jurisdiction.

8. City et al. (correctly, in Riffin’s opinion), argues that a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, should have been filed some time ago. City et al. argues: within 20 days of Conrail filing its NOE.

9. When Conrail filed its NOE, on January 7, 2009, it did so on the basis of the STB’s December 19, 2007 FD 34818 decision, wherein the STB held (reaffirmed its August 9, 2007 decision) that the Harsimus was a line of railroad.

¹ In footnote 1 of City et al.’s ‘reply,’ it noted that originally it was going to go down the same path that Conrail elected to go down: Not file anything until the STB ruled that it was accepting into the record Riffin’s Motion to Dismiss. Then they (wisely, in Riffin’s opinion), elected to file a reply. Riffin says ‘wisely,’ because there is no guarantee that the STB will permit late-filed replies. And, contrary to City et al.’s argument (City et al.’s reply at 2), if Riffin’s appeal is accepted pursuant to 49 CFR 1115.2, there is an automatic stay of ALJ Dring’s October 26, 2016 served decision. See 49 CFR 1115.2(f).

10. It was not until June 26, 2009, when the D.C. Circuit vacated the STB's FD 34818 decision, (ruling that the STB did not have the jurisdiction to determine how the Harsimus was conveyed to Conrail), that the proper classification for the Harsimus, was once again brought into question.

11. And it was not until **August 11, 2014**, when the STB lifted its April 20, 2010 stay, that a motion to dismiss (due to a lack of jurisdiction) could have been filed.

12. Unfortunately, no one thought to question, or to challenge, the STB's jurisdiction.² Until December 21, 2016. When Riffin was looking for ways to attack the ALJ Dring decision.

13. It appears that everyone forgot what Conrail had argued in 2009: That all the tracks were conveyed to Conrail as excepted track. And everyone forgot that Conrail has the burden of proving that the STB has the requisite jurisdiction to grant abandonment authority. And no one knew about / remembered, the Rocky Mount case. And no one bothered to note / acknowledge, that only that segment between CP Waldo and the West side of Marin Blvd had been declared to be a line of railroad.³

² While the LLCs have been trying since day one to kill the OFA process (in order to prevent Jersey City from taking the LLCs' Embankment properties for the princely sum of \$1), the LLCs counsel never thought to kill the entire 1189X proceeding (which would automatically kill the OFA process). And when the process started anew, ask the STB to exempt the proceeding from the OFA process. Given what has transpired to date, there is a reasonable probability that were the 1189X proceeding to be dismissed, then started anew, the STB would render a different set of decisions. (Like exempt it from the OFA process, not grant a more in-depth historic review, grant abandonment authority, then let the parties sort out the mess in a State court.)

³ Actually, the LLCs noted it. And tried to raise it as an issue. Both in the Special Court, and before the STB. Just not in the proper format. (Associated with a motion to dismiss.) In the Special Court, the Special Court would not address the issue, for doing so would have 'expanded the scope of the complaint' filed by City et al. (Which is not permitted, especially when requested by an intervenor, as the LLCs were.) And the STB would not address it in the context of the LLCs' motion to compel additional discovery against Conrail. (The status of the tracks East of Marin is not relevant in a discovery proceeding. The status of the tracks East of Marin is highly relevant in a motion to dismiss proceeding.) Just goes to show: How you ask a

14. And to this day, no one is willing to acknowledge that the proper classification for the tracks East of Marin Blvd is highly relevant. [City et al. has no interest in those track segments, so could care less. (City et al. Reply at 8.) Conrail continues to try to keep its head firmly buried in the sand, thinking that if it ignores the issue, the issue will magically go away. The LLCs think that it is highly relevant, but have been reluctant to pose the issue in a motion to dismiss.]

15. So that leaves Riffin to raise the issue. Which he did.

16. And that leaves the STB with the policy question: Does it want to ‘save’ the 1189X proceeding? Or does it want to dismiss the 1189X proceeding. And tell Conrail that it can try again, if it so desires.

17. Potentially, Conrail could file to abandon just the segment from CP Waldo to the West side of Marin Blvd. That segment has been declared to be a line of railroad. So there would be no jurisdictional issue. The problem with that approach is: It leaves the remainder of the Harsimus, and the Hudson Street Industrial Track, in a state of limbo. And were the tracks East of Marin Blvd later found to be lines of railroad,⁴ they would be ‘stranded’ lines of railroad. And since everyone is on notice that the tracks East of Marin Blvd are probably lines of railroad, no would could argue ‘surprise.’ And those stranded segments would be more than sufficient cause to vacate any decision granting abandonment authority for the CP Waldo / West of Marin Blvd segment. Which would make such a proceeding a total waste of time, energy, and money.

18. So, it gets back to a policy question: Does the STB want to ‘save’ the 1189X proceeding? If so, that can be done fairly easily: Order Conrail to show cause why it should

question often will determine the answer that you get.

⁴ A highly likely occurrence, since Riffin has every desire (if Conrail does not do it first) to file a complaint in the Special Court, seeking a determination as to whether the tracks East of Marin Blvd were **conveyed** to Conrail as lines of railroad.

not be ordered to file a complaint in the Special Court to determine whether any of the tracks East of Marin Blvd were **conveyed** to Conrail as lines of railroad (including the Hudson Street Industrial Track / Line Code 1440). Let it be known that if Conrail were to file such a complaint (say within 30 days of the show cause order), and if Conrail were to request the STB to stay the 1189X proceeding while the Special Court addresses the issue, the STB would grant such a stay request.

19. If the Special Court rules that the Harsimus tracks East of Marin Blvd were conveyed to Conrail as a line of railroad, then the 1189X proceeding would be ‘saved.’ (The entirety being a line of railroad, would vest the STB with the jurisdiction to grant abandonment authority for the entirety of the Harsimus.) If not conveyed to Conrail as a line of railroad, that would permit Conrail to abandon the Harsimus segment East of Marin Blvd **without** prior STB authority.

20. And since it was determined by the Special Court that the tracks East of Marin Blvd were conveyed to Conrail as lines of railroad, Conrail would incur no liability for **knowingly** selling the real property associated with those lines of railroad, without STB authority. (Conrail could probably successfully argue that it did not **knowingly** convey lines of railroad without prior STB approval, since it was not **known** that they were lines of railroad until the Special Court make such a determination. And the STB has made it a policy not to hold a carrier liable for violating the STB’s regulations, unless such violation was done **knowingly**.)

21. Another possibility is the LLCs, Jersey City, and the Metro Plaza owners / developers, could join forces against Conrail: File their own complaint in the Special Court (individually, or jointly). When a decision is rendered, sue Conrail (if conveyed as lines of railroad), or invite Conrail to a celebration party (if not conveyed as lines of railroad).

22. And yet another possibility, is for all of the parties (including Conrail), to agree to stipulate that the tracks East of Marin Blvd were conveyed to Conrail as lines of railroad / agree not to oppose a NOE to abandon all of the tracks East of Marin Blvd / agree to exempt such an abandonment proceeding from the OFA process / agree not to hold Conrail liable for damages (or

agree to limit those damages to something Conrail is willing to stipulate to) / agree to exempt the CP Waldo – West of Marin Blvd segment from the OFA process / agree to support the 1189X abandonment proceeding. In other words: Reach a settlement.

ALJ DRING APPEAL

24. In case no one noticed, the STB, in a decision served on **January 11, 2017** in FD 35981, (Finch Paper v. CP) rendered a decision which clarifies, and sets the standards, for appeals of ALJ decisions in discovery disputes, including discovery disputes in abandonment proceedings. (See FN 9.)

25. Appeals are per 49 CFR 1115.9. Appeals are due within 7 days of the decision being appealed. An appeal will be accepted if timely filed, and if it meets the criteria in 1115.9. The standard for reversing is either “clear error of judgment or to prevent manifest injustice.” [Same as in 1115.1(c).]

26. While CP filed its appeal within 20 days of the ALJ’s decision (rather than the required 7 days), the STB accepted CP’s appeal, since its regulations were “unclear” on appeals of discovery decisions.

27. Riffin started his appeal process on day five. His 1115.2 appeal was filed on day 18. Given what the STB did in the Finch Paper proceeding, it is likely that the STB will accept Riffin’s ALJ Dring appeal. (Riffin meets the criteria in 1115.9.) Or, the STB could remand it back to ALJ Dring for “more detail,” as it did in the Finch Paper proceeding.

28. In Finch Paper, a reply was timely filed. In this proceeding, City et al. filed a reply on 11/4/16. That is within 7 days of Riffin filing his petition for other relief. The LLCs filed a reply on 11/21/16, which is 21 days after Riffin filed his Petition for Other Relief, and 8 days after Riffin filed his 1115.2 appeal. Conrail elected not to file any reply. Whether the replies will be accepted, is presently unknown. If the matter is remanded back to ALJ Dring for more

details, it will become a moot matter.

29. And those are Riffin's 'observations.'

Respectfully,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on or before the 20th Day of January, 2017, a copy of the foregoing Riffin's Observations regarding his Motion to Dismiss, was served on all of the parties in this proceeding, either via e-mail, or via U.S. Postal Service, postage prepaid. A copy was also served on all of the parties in the FD 36078 proceeding.

James Riffin

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

DECISION

Docket No. FD 35981

FINCH PAPER LLC—PETITION FOR DECLARATORY ORDER

Digest:¹ This decision, on appeal of a discovery order of an Administrative Law Judge at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), clarifies the Board's regulations with respect to appeals and remands the matter to FERC.

Decided: January 11, 2017

On September 13, 2016, Delaware and Hudson Railroad, d/b/a CP Rail (CP Rail), appealed the August 24, 2016 "Order of Administrative Law Judge on Motion to Compel Discovery Responses," issued by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which granted, in its entirety, a motion to compel discovery filed by Finch Paper LLC (Finch Paper). The Board is remanding this matter to FERC, for the reasons discussed below.

BACKGROUND

By petition filed on December 7, 2015, Finch Paper seeks a declaratory order from the Board that certain practices and actions by CP Rail relating to CP Rail's assessment of demurrage charges against Finch Paper are unreasonable practices in violation of 49 U.S.C. §§ 10702 and 10746 and that CP Rail has violated its common carrier obligation under 49 U.S.C. § 11101.² By a decision served on February 11, 2016, the Board instituted a declaratory order proceeding and established a procedural schedule for the completion of discovery and the submission of evidence.

As relevant here, Finch Paper served CP Rail with two sets of discovery requests, its first on February 18, 2016, and its second on April 11, 2016. Among its first set of discovery requests, Finch Paper included Document Request Nos. 30 and 34, which sought, respectively,

¹ The digest constitutes no part of the decision of the Board but has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It may not be cited to or relied upon as precedent. See Policy Statement on Plain Language Digests in Decisions, EP 696 (STB served Sept. 2, 2010).

² This matter was referred to the Board by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on November 10, 2015, in Delaware & Hudson Railway v. Finch Paper LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00417-TJM-TWD.

documents pertaining to notices or enforcement actions by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and to CP Rail's Customer Audit Safety forms.³ Among its second set of discovery requests, Finch Paper included Interrogatory Nos. 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, and Document Request Nos. 40, 41, 42, and 44, which sought information and documents pertaining to business plans that called for reducing employees and locomotives, employee terminations, reallocation of crews and locomotives, changes to the customer service department, and prior service issues.

CP Rail objected to these requests. (See Finch Paper Mot. to Compel at Ex. A.) On July 1, 2016, Finch Paper filed with the Board a motion to compel discovery related to these requests. As to the first set of discovery requests, Finch Paper argues that its requests are narrowly defined, not burdensome, and relevant to the proceeding because they seek information related to determining whether delays in picking up or delivering rail cars, and the demurrage charges levied, were related to safety and FRA compliance issues. (See Finch Paper Mot. to Compel at 4-5.) As to the second set of discovery requests, Finch Paper asserts that the discovery sought is specific and related to whether CP Rail's reductions in the number of its employees, including train crews, adversely impacted CP Rail's ability to satisfy its service obligations to Finch Paper. (Id.) Finch Paper also contends that CP Rail's decision to cut back on locomotives and railcars is directly relevant to the issue of whether CP Rail violated its common carrier obligations under 49 U.S.C. § 11101. (Id. at 8-9.)

On July 21, 2016, CP Rail opposed Finch Paper's motion. CP Rail argued that Finch Paper's motion to compel should be denied in its entirety because it was untimely. As to the merits of the motion, CP Rail claimed that the documents sought are irrelevant, that the requests are overly broad and unduly burdensome, and that the discovery sought would require it to conduct a special study. (See CP Rail Reply Mot. to Compel at 2.) Finch Paper and CP Rail also filed surreplies, on August 3 and August 8, 2016, respectively.

On August 16, 2016, the Board, through the Director of the Office of Proceedings, accepted Finch Paper's July 1, 2016 motion to compel over CP Rail's objections that it was untimely, noting that CP Rail continued to produce responsive documents as late as June 30, 2016. That decision also accepted Finch Paper's and CP Rail's surreplies. The Board then referred Finch Paper's motion to compel to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), pursuant to the Board's and FERC's Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) authorizing the Board to refer certain matters to FERC ALJs for resolution. See Finch Paper LLC—Pet. for Declaratory Order, FD 35981, slip op. at 1 (STB served Aug. 16, 2016).

On August 24, 2016, the ALJ granted Finch Paper's motion to compel in its entirety. The ALJ found that the motion was not untimely based on the Board's referral order. See Finch

³ According to CP Rail, these are forms that it uses to document its safety inspections of its customers' track facilities. (CP Rail Reply to Mot. to Compel at 6.)

Paper LLC—Pet. for Declaratory Order, FD 35891, slip op. at 1 (STB served Aug. 24, 2016). The ALJ then explained that Finch Paper “may request from CP [Rail] any information or document(s) having any tendency to make any fact of consequence to the Board’s final determination in the proceeding more or less probable than it would be without the information or document(s).” The ALJ found that Finch Paper’s requests met this standard. (See id.) Additionally, the ALJ determined, after review of the discovery requests, that there was no need for CP Rail to conduct any special study in order to respond. (Id.)

On September 13, 2016, CP Rail appealed the ALJ’s ruling to the entire Board, citing 49 C.F.R. § 1115.2. CP Rail argues that the August 24, 2016 ALJ decision meets all of the § 1115.2(b) criteria and should be reversed because: (1) there was no hearing or conference held on the motion (see CP Rail Appeal at 2); (2) the ALJ’s decision provides no explanation as to how the discovery requests are relevant or how this information would assist the Board in deciding the issues before it (see id. at 3-9); and (3) the ALJ’s decision does not address CP Rail’s arguments as to the unduly burdensome nature of Finch Paper’s discovery requests (see id. at 10-12).

Finch Paper filed a reply in opposition to CP Rail’s appeal on September 16, 2016. Finch Paper asserts that CP Rail’s appeal is untimely because CP Rail incorrectly appealed under § 1115.2, which has a 20-day filing deadline, when instead, CP Rail’s appeal should have been filed under either 49 C.F.R. § 1115.1 (10-day deadline) or 49 C.F.R. § 1115.9 (7-day deadline) (see Finch Paper Reply at 2-3), in which case CP Rail’s appeal was late. Finch Paper further argues that CP Rail’s appeal does not meet the standard of review under either § 1115.1 or § 1115.9 (see id. at 4-5, 8-10), and that the discovery sought by Finch Paper is relevant, as determined by the ALJ (see id. at 6-8).

On September 19, 2016, CP Rail filed a letter-response to Finch Paper’s reply in opposition to the appeal. CP Rail argues that, even if its appeal is deemed to be untimely, accepting it will not prejudice Finch Paper, and that its appeal meets the standards of either § 1115.1(c) or § 1115.9(b) because the ALJ’s decision contains a clear error of judgment that resulted in manifest injustice. (See CP Rail Letter at 2).⁴

On September 27, 2016, Finch Paper filed a motion to hold the procedural schedule in abeyance pending final resolution of CP Rail’s appeal. CP Rail filed a reply in opposition to Finch Paper’s motion on September 29, 2016. By a decision served on October 6, 2016, the Board granted the motion to hold the procedural schedule in abeyance while the Board considered CP Rail’s appeal.

⁴ CP Rail’s letter is a reply to a reply. In the interest of compiling a more complete record, we will accept CP Rail’s letter. See City of Alexandria, Va.—Pet. for Declaratory Order, FD 35157, slip op. at 2 (STB served Nov. 6, 2008) (allowing reply to reply “[i]n the interest of compiling a full record”).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The parties disagree on the appropriate regulation under which the appeal at issue should have been filed, and thus the appropriate filing deadlines and standards. CP Rail argues that an appeal of the ALJ order should be decided under § 1115.2. Finch Paper argues that CP Rail's appeal should have been filed under either § 1115.1 or § 1115.9. (Finch Paper Reply at 1.) The Board's standard for appeals of decisions on matters such as a motion to compel discovery is, based on Board precedent, unclear. This decision clarifies the Board's regulations and procedures for interlocutory appeals of decisions by ALJs (or by Board staff) on discovery.

CP Rail's reliance on § 1115.2 as the standard for appeals of the FERC ALJ's order is misplaced. Section 1115.2, titled "Initial Decisions," pertains to "initial decision[s] of an administrative law judge, individual Board Member, or employee board." However, CP Rail's appeal is not of an "initial decision." In the context of § 1115.2, an "initial decision" means an initial decision on the merits by an ALJ—a procedural practice that the agency no longer utilizes.⁵ Because a ruling by a FERC ALJ on a discovery issue is not a determination on the merits, such a ruling is not an initial decision under § 1115.2. Thus, the § 1115.2(e) standards related to such appeals are not applicable to CP Rail's motion.

In contrast, Finch Paper argues that CP Rail's appeal should have been filed under either § 1115.1 or § 1115.9, though it notes some "uncertainty" as to which is the appropriate regulation. (Finch Paper Reply at 1.) Section 1115.1, titled "Scope of Rule," states in relevant part as follows:

Appeals from the decisions of employees acting under authority delegated to them by the Chairman of the Board pursuant to [49 C.F.R.] § 1011.6 will be acted upon by the entire Board. Appeals must be filed within 10 days of the date of the action taken by the employee, and responses to appeals must be filed within 10 days thereafter. Such appeals are not favored; they will be granted only in exceptional circumstances to correct a clear error of judgment or to prevent manifest injustice.

49 C.F.R. § 1115.1(c).⁶ Section 1115.9, titled "Interlocutory Appeals," states in relevant part as follows:

⁵ The Board's Rules of Practice, which include 49 C.F.R. Part 1115—Appellate Procedures, were adopted when the agency's predecessor used its own ALJs and individual agency members and employee boards to issue initial decisions on the merits. It is to these sorts of decisions that § 1115.2 was directed.

⁶ This appeal standard mirrors that found in § 1011.6(b), which is cited in the MOU.

Rulings of Board employees, including administrative law judges, may be appealed prior to service of the initial decision⁷ only if:

- (1) The ruling denies or terminates any person's participation;
- (2) The ruling grants a request for the inspection of documents not ordinarily available for public inspection;
- (3) The ruling overrules an objection based on privilege, the result of which is to require the presentation of testimony or documents; or
- (4) The ruling may result in substantial irreparable harm, substantial detriment to the public interest, or undue prejudice to a party.

49 C.F.R. § 1115.9(a).

As the parties note, the Board has cited both § 1115.1 and § 1115.9 in its decisions resolving appeals of discovery rulings.⁸ The Board clarifies here that, going forward, it will read these two regulations in conjunction as a two-part standard for interlocutory appeals, as follows. An interlocutory appeal is an appeal prior to a final Board decision on the merits of a proceeding. Under § 1115.9(a), a Board employee's ruling on discovery (including an ALJ's ruling) may be appealed on an interlocutory basis only if it meets one of the four enumerated circumstances (regarding party participation; document inspection; privilege; or irreparable harm, prejudice, or detriment to the public interest). Thus, § 1115.9(a) is a threshold determination concerning whether the decision is of a type that is subject to an interlocutory appeal. If the § 1115.9(a) threshold is satisfied and the ruling can be appealed prior to a final Board decision, the merits of the appeal are analyzed under the standard outlined in § 1115.1(c).⁹ Although appeals are

⁷ The provisions of § 1115.9, like those of § 1115.2, refer to initial decisions. However, when each section is read in its broader context, it is clear that the entire focus of § 1115.2 is on how substantively to appeal an initial merits decision by an ALJ or other agency employee (which, as noted, no longer exist), while the focus of § 1115.9 is on interlocutory appeals, i.e., appeals of preliminary decisions not on the merits. Therefore, we conclude that despite the use of the term "initial decision," § 1115.9 was intended to focus on interlocutory appeals of preliminary rulings.

⁸ In revising the appellate procedures in 1996, the agency indicated that appeals from rulings on discovery would be governed by § 1115.9, although the Board also cited to § 1115.1. Expedited Procedures for Processing Rail Rate Reasonableness, Exemption & Revocation Proceedings, 1 S.T.B. 754, 768-70 (1996).

⁹ We note that § 1115.1(a) provides that abandonments and discontinuances are governed by the appellate procedures at 49 C.F.R. Part 1152. However, those regulations apply to substantive decisions on the merits in abandonment and discontinuance cases, in which there typically is no discovery. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.25(e)(2). The Board clarifies that, notwithstanding § 1115.1(a), appeals of discovery decisions in abandonments, to the extent

(continued . . .)

sometimes granted, under that standard, such appeals “are not favored,” and “will be granted only in exceptional circumstances to correct a clear error of judgment or to prevent manifest injustice.” Id.

In this instance, CP Rail appeals an order of a FERC ALJ, who works for the Board by virtue of 5 U.S.C. § 3344, and who has been delegated authority by the Chairman of the Board under 49 C.F.R. § 1011.6, to resolve discovery disputes such as this one. The appeal at issue here is thus interlocutory (not an appeal of an initial decision on the merits), and as such, is governed at the outset by the threshold established in § 1115.9. If the appeal falls into one of the § 1115.9 categories, then the Board can consider whether the FERC ALJ’s decision meets the appellate standard of § 1115.1.

Here, CP Rail’s appeal, which was filed under the incorrect regulation, was technically untimely.¹⁰ However, in light of our clarification of the rules that apply to appeals, we will waive our filing deadline and accept the appeal for filing.

As previously noted, the Board and FERC, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3344 and 31 U.S.C. § 1535, have a MOU authorizing the Board to refer certain matters to FERC ALJs for resolution, and the discovery motion at issue here was referred to the ALJ pursuant to this MOU. Under Section 1 of the MOU, the ALJ is to “provide a written decision of sufficient clarity and detail to the STB so that the STB can adjudicate any appeal.” In deciding an appeal, the Board must, as an initial matter, understand the basis for the ALJ’s ruling. Here, however, although the ALJ did cite the familiar standard for discovery—that it could lead to information that could be relevant to a decision on the merits—we cannot sufficiently discern the basis for the ALJ’s ruling based on the level of detail contained in the written decision. Therefore, we will return the matter to FERC for a further decision (with or without hearings, as deemed appropriate). Accordingly, although we have accepted CP Rail’s appeal for filing, we will deny it as moot in light of our ruling. Any party aggrieved after a further decision on remand may appeal under the procedures described above. In the meantime, the Board encourages the parties to make a good faith effort to resolve this discovery dispute.

(continued . . .)

discovery may occur, will be governed by the same rules and standards that apply to other discovery appeals.

¹⁰ See § 1115.9(b) (“[i]n all other cases [aside from rate cases], interlocutory appeals shall be filed with the Board within seven (7) calendar days”).

It is ordered:

1. CP Rail's appeal and letter dated September 19, 2016, are accepted for filing.
2. This matter is remanded to FERC, as described above, and CP Rail's appeal is denied as moot.
3. This decision is effective on its service date.

By the Board, Chairman Elliott, Vice Chairman Miller, and Commissioner Begeman.